Course Details in 2024/25 Session

Module Title	LI Speaking of Things
School	Phil, Theology and Religion
Department	Philosophy
Module Code	09 26763
Module Lead	Darragh Byrne
Level	Intermediate Level
Credits	20
Semester	Semester 1
Pre-requisites
Co-requisites
Restrictions	None
Contact Hours	Practical Classes and workshops-30 hours Guided independent study-170 hours Total: 200 hours
Exclusions
Description	When you speak, write or think, your sentences or thoughts are about particular constituents of the world. This phenomenon is reference and this module examines the most important attempts that philosophers have made to explain it. 20th century authors tended to regard this as primarily a question about the relation between certain words (nouns) and the objects they pick out, and so the topic provides a natural introduction to philosophy of language (an area that students are likely to pursue further, later in their programme, even if only indirectly through modules in metaphysics, meta-ethics, etc.). But we also refer to objects in thought, so reference is an issue for the philosophy of mind (and further, to epistemology, meta-ethics, etc.) as well as one for philosophy of language. We’ll begin with the classic debate between theorists who consider the relation between a word and its referent to be direct, and those who hold it to be mediated by something like the speaker’s conception of the referent. We’ll explore the theories of two important advocates of the latter view – Frege and Russell (each of whose views concern thought as well as language) and we’ll assess how they deal with puzzles such as that thrown up by words and thoughts (e.g. of fictional characters) that appear to lack referents altogether. Theories of the Frege/Russell kind were subjected to fierce (and, the orthodoxy has it, fatal) attack in the 1970s and 80s by philosophers such as Kripke and Putnam, and new versions (broadly naturalistic in character) of the direct reference view emerged. We’ll examine these debates and assess the new theories. Next we’ll turn our attention to semantic externalism, a striking doctrine in the philosophy of mind and language that came to prominence through reflection on that new theory. This is (roughly) the view that the identity of a thought or word-meaning depends on its referent, and so in a sense cannot be wholly constituted by what’s going on in a thinker/speaker’s brain. Although this thesis belongs to the metaphysics of mind, it has repercussions in epistemology, where philosophers have brought considerations about reference to bear in a new attempt to rebut Cartesian scepticism. If time permits, we’ll also consider another issue on the metaphysics/epistemology border: the anti-realism about reference itself which is promoted by advocates of semantic holism such as Quine and Davidson.
Learning Outcomes	By the end of the module students should be able to: show understanding of a range of influential positions on, inter alia, the philosophical issues mentioned above evaluate such positions critically: i.e. understand the salient philosophical arguments for and against the positions, and the salient relations between them construct arguments of their own defending and/or attacking such positions, to evaluate arguments formulated by others, and to present such arguments clearly; verbally and in writing manifest strength in general philosophical skills such as the interpretation of philosophical literature and the analysis and evaluation of philosophical argument
Assessment	26763-01 : 1000 word Take Home Exam (24hrs) : Coursework (50%) 26763-02 : 1750 word Essay : Coursework (50%)
Assessment Methods & Exceptions	Assessments: 1 x 24hr 1000 word take-home exam and 1 x 1750 word essay (worth 50% each) Reassessment: The same
Other
Reading List